



# **Civil-Military Relations Reforms in Indonesia**

## **A Case Study**



# **Civil-Military Relations Reforms in Indonesia**

## **A Case Study**

PILDAT is an independent, non-partisan and not-for-profit indigenous research and training institution with the mission to strengthen democracy and democratic institutions in Pakistan.

PILDAT is a registered non-profit entity under the Societies Registration Act XXI of 1860, Pakistan.

Copyright ©Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And Transparency – PILDAT

All Rights Reserved

Printed in Pakistan

First Published: December 2008

Second Edition: July 2017

ISBN: 978-969-558-698-3

Any part of this publication can be used or cited with a clear reference to PILDAT.



**Islamabad Office:** P. O. Box 278, F-8, Postal Code: 44220, Islamabad, Pakistan  
**Lahore Office:** P. O. Box 11098, L.C.C.H.S, Postal Code: 54792, Lahore, Pakistan  
E-mail: [info@pildat.org](mailto:info@pildat.org) | Website: [www.pildat.org](http://www.pildat.org)

# CONTENTS

<i>Preface</i>	05
<i>Profile of Authors</i>	07
Accomplishments and Strategic Gaps in Indonesia's Military Reform	08
The Armed Forces: Withdrawal from Politics and Force Re-structuring	08
The Ministry of Defence: Civilianisation and Policy-Making Function	11
The Parliament	13
Civil Society	14
Macro-Structural factors	16
Conclusion	18
Bibliography	19



## **Preface**

**Civil-Military Relations Reforms in Indonesia: A Case Study** was co-presented by **Mr. Ali Abdullah Wibisono** and **Dr. Makmur Keliat** from University of Indonesia at the PILDAT International Conference on Civil-Military Relations on October 21-22, 2008, Lahore, Pakistan. In 2017, ahead of PILDAT Study Visit to Indonesia, the authors of the paper were requested to update the paper to reflect latest developments in the context of civil-military relations in Indonesia.

With special thanks to **Dr. Ali Abdullah Wibisono**, this edition, therefore, carries a recent and updated account of development of Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia.

### **Disclaimer**

The views expressed in this paper belong to the author and are not necessarily shared by PILDAT.

Lahore  
July 2017



## ABOUT THE AUTHOR



**Ali Abdullah Wibisono** is a tenured lecturer and deputy head of graduate programme at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia. He obtained his Ph. D (2015) and MA (2008) from University of Nottingham, and bachelor's degree (2005) from Universitas Indonesia. His research focuses on the state and public responses to terrorism. He convenes modules of international security studies in Universitas Indonesia, including Theories of International Security, Non-Traditional Security, and International Security Institutions. He has given seminars on issues of East Asian regional security, non-traditional security and Indonesian terrorism and counter-terrorism. He also wrote and edited publication on intelligence reform, while coordinating civil society organizations to push for legislation of intelligence bill. He used to serve as Programme Director at The RIDEP Institute and Pacivis Universitas Indonesia, maintaining ongoing and developing new research/advocacy programmes and wrote legislation manual book on intelligence bill and a book on Indonesian intelligence.

## **Accomplishments and Strategic Gaps in Indonesia's Military Reform**

The principle objective of military reform in Indonesia as it began in 1998 has been to create a professional armed force which was totally removed from the character of the TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia – Indonesian Armed Forces). The biggest challenge in achieving this objective is the fact that in its inception, the TNI was – and still partly been - a political army, while the society at large has accustomed itself to this condition. Therefore, not only military reform is expected to lead to a professionally equipped and deployed military, but it also requires social and political transformation (Wibisono, Wardoyo, and Kasim 2008). In other words, this aim of military reform is in line with efforts to strengthen Indonesia's path to democratization.

The greatest achievement of Indonesia's reform of civil-military relations is the abstinence of the military in its domestic politics (Honna 2006). The first measurement of success in upholding civilian control over the armed forces as per Croissant and Kuehn is when there is 'civilian dominance of elite recruitment and overall public policymaking' (Mietzner 2011). Not only that elections in Indonesia immediately in the post-1998 could be described as free and fair but they were also free from the influence of the military. Electoral rights in Indonesia were also expanded by introducing direct ballots for local leaders on gubernatorial and mayoral elections since 2005. Since 2004, parliament membership reserved for the military has been entirely abolished. Local and national leaders with military background also dropped below 10% in 2010 from over 80% in 1970s. Parliament members who were retired military officers dropped to only 2% (Sebastian and Gindarsah 2011).

This is not to say that Indonesian democracy is flawless. Indeed, one of the major deficiencies in Indonesia's democracy that has been identified by observers and academics is the rise of the power of civilian oligarchic networks at the national and local level elections that are backed by politicians with plenty of cash ready to disburse for mobilising votes, entrepreneurs and bureaucrats who already occupy executive and legislative positions as political parties some of which have dominance over the media (Fukuoka 2012). None of these deficiencies, however, relate to the influence of the military in domestic politics. Instead, the retired military officers, except for Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Prabowo Subianto, have found it difficult to compete with cashed-up

civilian leaders (Mietzner 2011).

This study is aimed at explaining the achievements and unfinished agendas of Indonesia's military reform. It will be divided in accordance with sectors of stakeholders: the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI), the Ministry of Defence, the civil society, and macro-structural environment.

## **The Armed Forces: Withdrawal from Politics and Force Re-structuring**

The withdrawal of the military from politics in Indonesia was not due to pressures from the civilian leaders. The Indonesian military is an institution that understands itself as a 'self-creating entity', which means it does not owe itself to the nation for its existence; quite on the contrary, it perceives itself as having sacrificed so much to preserve the existence of the republic (Widjajanto 2007).

The TNI's main reason for its involvement in Indonesian politics lies in the institution's own conception of the role and responsibility in safeguarding the nation against political stability (Wibisono & Keliat 2008). The TNI's experience in playing central role in the struggle against the Dutch and suppression of local rebellions in the 1950s and the abortive coup in 1965 have built a conception of the armed forces as guardian against potential betrayals to the nation (Freedman 2000). This conception was embodied in the doctrine called *dwifungsi* or dual function which the TNI itself has already abolished (Rabasa and Haseman 2002; Ramage, n.d.). TNI's withdrawal from domestic politics was also not due to pressures external to the institution. It needs to be noticed that an accomplishment of the withdrawal of the military from national and local succession of leaders did not begin with civilian leaders' initiative; rather, it was the TNI itself who initiated the withdrawal from domestic politics (Widjajanto 2007).

The abstinence of the military in the national and local elections began within the body of the military organisation itself called Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI). The single most crucial stepping stone and achievement accomplished in the history of civil-military relations reform in Indonesia is the withdrawal of the military from the national political affairs, and it began not with the decision of civilian leaders but rather with the military itself. The first documented evidence that proved the withdrawal of the military from politics was called "New Paradigm" which was released by the Headquarter of TNI in 1999 (Honna

2008). As per this document, the new TNI is expected to change its approach to national problems by allowing other components of the nation to take charge and share role with it. No longer did it require itself to occupy trouble spots of the nation but rather to influence or even indirectly influence civilian leaders in resolving them.

The initiative to withdraw the military from domestic political leadership was further explicated in another document released by the TNI Headquarter in 2001 in which it is stated that the TNI's internal reform consisted of five main elements:

- i. gradual surrender of its socio-political role,
- ii. focus on national defence tasks,
- iii. the handing-over of internal security tasks to the police,
- iv. consistent implementation of the joint doctrine and
- v. the improvement of internal management performance (Widjajanto 2007).

This is not to say that there has been no initiative from the civilian leaders to conduct civil-military relations reform, but rather such initiative would not have gained enough momentum had it not been supported by the willingness of the TNI itself. The internal reform within the military has allowed for other efforts in the wider security sector reform.

First is the promulgation of TNI Law 34/2004 that delineates where TNI officers can still serve as active members of the military.

Second is the elimination of military role in formal

---

**This is not to say that there has been no initiative from the civilian leaders to conduct civil-military relations reform, but rather such initiative would not have gained enough momentum had it not been supported by the willingness of the TNI itself. The internal reform within the military has allowed for other efforts in the wider security sector reform**

---

policy-making process and the abolition of the Dual-Function doctrine that directs the military to have both political and defence roles. Law No. 34/2004 on TNI demarcates the role of the TNI to uphold the state's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the protection of the citizens and critical infrastructures against armed threats from both internal and external environments. The law also re-aligns the organisational hierarchy and authority of TNI's high-command; authorisation on the use of force; and the rights and responsibilities of soldiers (Sebastian and Gindarsah 2013). In a nutshell, these laws ban the TNI's involvement in economic and political enterprises. This latter impact has driven the reform within the Ministry of Defence to reform itself towards civilianisation and strengthening its function in an accountable defence-policy making.

The fact that civil-military relations reform was more of an initiative of the military rather than the civilian leaders means that the sustainability of civil-military relations reform is less than reliable. Because Indonesian voters and political parties do not prioritise civilian control over the armed forces as well as other coercive elements of the republic, the agenda of reform tends to halt without conclusive termination.

#### *Force Structure*

The territorial command or KOTER system is a principle module of deployment for the TNI's battalions throughout the archipelago that has been implemented since 1950s. In order to deploy its 60 infantry battalions throughout the archipelago, the TNI relies mainly on the 12 Regional Military Commands (or KODAM for short) positioned in various parts of the country. These battalions are less than well-armed and still lack the capability to respond to flash points of conflicts in the country (IDSPS 2008). The marginally better units consist of Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD) and Special Forces Command (KOPASSUS), both are located at the Army's Central Command. The lack of strategic airlift capabilities is suffered by all army units and compromises their ability for immediate deployment in emergency situations. In addition, the KOTER system has been continually criticised to influence domestic politics in informal ways of mobilising locals for particular candidates (Mietzner 2011).

In the past, the KOTER system has allowed Presidents Sukarno and Suharto to consolidate their power. As KOTER's institutional structure remains intact and even expanded in the post-Suharto era, it is believed that it continually maintains influence over local and

national electoral politics (Sebastian and Gindarsah 2011).

Reforming Indonesia's force structure has been an ongoing effort since 2001. However, a significant development on this matter came in 2007 when a Ministry of Defence's strategic planning document mentioned the plan for a new system of TNI deployment called Defence Area Commands or KODAHAN for short. KODAHAN involves a joint unit of combat forces from the three services of the TNI and arranges them in a joint battle command structure (Sukadis 2007). The new deployment system is devised to explicitly consider the archipelagic nature of Indonesia's geo-strategic architecture which begets the demand to protect its Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCS). These SLOCS are connecting four world's vital chokepoints that are in Indonesia, namely the Sunda Strait, Malacca Strait, Lombok Strait and Makassar Strait (Zebec 2016). Unavoidably, the new deployment system mandates the emphasis on the capability of the Navy, the build-up of a naval force capable of deterring foreign Sea Fleet from gaining sea access to Indonesia littoral areas. By the same token, the new deployment system also requires an end to the strong penchant of the Indonesia's defence on the Army.

The new territorial structure is gradually built to follow the compartmentalisation of Indonesian Archipelago Sea Lanes (Alur Laut Kepulauan Indonesia/ALKI) which is designed based on UNCLOS 1982 (The ASEAN Secretariat 2015). ALKI divides Indonesia into four defence compartments separated by a line connecting seas and choke points. From east to west, these compartments are: Maluku-Papua Compartment, Sulawesi-Nusa Tenggara Compartment with Arafuru Sea Lane, Kalimantan-Jawa-Bali compartment with Sulawesi Sea – Lombok Strait lane, and Sumatra defence compartment with South China Sea – Malacca Strait – Sunda Strait lane. Five regional commands are formed in between these ALKIs: KODAHAN I in Sumatera; KODAHAN II in Java; KODAHAN III in Kalimantan; KODAHAN IV in Sulawesi-Bali-Nusa

Tenggara; and KODAHAN V in Maluku and Papua (Sukadis 2007).

The KODAHAN system is not yet implemented. Indonesia is still building up its Naval forces to the point of sufficiency for defending its EEZ waters. One of the ongoing efforts to achieve this sufficiency is the establishment of new Naval Main Bases on the eastern areas of Indonesia. Indonesian Navy now deploys its forces in two Navy Main Fleet Commands, East and West (Komando Armada Barat / West Fleet Command and Komando Armada Timur/ East Fleet Command). East Fleet Command is based in Surabaya, East Java

and is responsible for navy operations on North and East Java Sea, Southern Indian Ocean, Makassar Strait, Bali Strait, Lombok Strait, Arafuru Sea, Sulawesi Sea to the Pacific Ocean. East Fleet Command comprises of seven Naval Bases in Surabaya, Makassar, Kupang, Ambon, Jayapura and Merauke (Widjajanto 2007). Additional three are established in 2015 in Pontianak, Tarakan and Sorong. Each Naval Base is supported by two types of combat units (Gugus Tempur) to serve the purposes of power projection and maritime security and law enforcement (TNI AL 2017). These ongoing developments

suggest that Indonesia's military build-up has begun to take into account its character as an archipelagic state. The Naval bases on Indonesia's eastern fleet are expected to perform as a fulcrum to a joint defence posture that integrates land, sea and air forces responding to contingencies in Indonesia's outer Islands.

TNI's new doctrine was developed in 2007 expected to shape a professional military culture that nurtures an outward looking attitude (DEPHAN RI 2007). The TNI headquarters principle doctrine Tri Dharma Eka Karma obliges the TNI to prepare for projection strategies that applies deterrence and denial capabilities. The new doctrine also drives the TNI towards abandoning law enforcement measures, militia training, and public order maintenance missions.

**The fact that civil-military relations reform was more of an initiative of the military rather than the civilian leaders means that the sustainability of civil-military relations reform is less than reliable. Because Indonesian voters and political parties do not prioritise civilian control over the armed forces as well as other coercive elements of the republic, the agenda of reform tends to halt without conclusive termination**

### ***Off Budget Fund-Raising***

The standard of professional security forces in democratic states also mandates the armed forces to steer clear from practices of self-funding practices. The TNI is still not immune to such practices. In 2010, around 20% of the military's budget is fulfilled by sources outside of the state's funding, most of which in the form of businesses, foundations, but also illegal activities such as unlicensed logging activities and mining operations, gambling, even prostitutions; this number had sharply decreased from the Suharto-years of 70% of the military's budget (Mietzner 2014).

A smaller percentage of the military's budget does not necessarily mean a smaller intake of money, since the budget for the military consistently increases over the years. In 2009, a presidential decree was issued announcing a government's initiative to take over military businesses; but this action was proved ineffective as it failed to consider the cooperatives and foundations that performed as a holding company for TNI's businesses (Sebastian and Gindarsah 2013). Instead, the government's initiative took over TNI's businesses that were already faltering towards bankruptcy (Hainsworth 2007).

Moreover, TNI's moonlighting and illegal business activities were also claimed by the government to be beyond the scope of its initiative to phase out TNI's businesses (Mietzner 2011). Off-state budget funding allows the military units to raise and spend money outside of civilian control mechanisms. Meanwhile, as the parliament lacks the culture of oversight on defence

---

**The standard of professional security forces in democratic states also mandates the armed forces to steer clear from practices of self-funding practices. The TNI is still not immune to such practices. In 2010, around 20% of the military's budget is fulfilled by sources outside of the state's funding, most of which in the form of businesses, foundations, but also illegal activities such as unlicensed**

---

and strategic matters, low levels of legal accountability makes it difficult for the government to hold responsible the officers who are proved to be violating its orders.

### ***Civilian Court for the Military***

Finally, a problem related to the TNI the regulation on TNI officers who committed human rights violations against civilians and whether those officers should be put to trial in civilian courts (Honna 2008).

More than a decade after the end of authoritarianism, TNI members still face only mild punishments for human rights abuses or other transgressions (Human Rights Watch, 2010). For instance, soldiers who had tortured a Papuan detainee by branding the man's genitals were sentenced in January 2011 to less than 10 months in prison. Previously, the government had blocked legislation in parliament that would have allowed for soldiers to be tried in civilian courts rather than military tribunals, which are notorious for their leniency (Mietzner 2011).

### **The Ministry of Defence: Civilianisation and Policy-Making Function**

The substantive reform of Indonesia's MoD began with the promulgation of Law No. 2/2002 on State Defence (*Pertahanan Negara* literally translates into State Defence instead of National Defence). The MoD sets the regulations on the roles and authorities of the Ministry of Defence in defence policy-making, and its institutional relationship with TNI Headquarters as well as other government institutions. In addition, it also regulates the authorisation on the use of military force, the management of defence resources; and the parliamentary oversight on defence matters.

Indonesia's MoD is continually thriving to become a well-functioning institution of defence policy-making in a democratic state, which means producing transparent and accountable defence development strategies. Ministers of Defence since 1999 have always been held by a civilian, with Minister of Defence Ryamizard Ryacudu as an exception as a person with military background. Between 2009 and 2015, the MoD has produced strategic mid-term and long-term policies including Defence White Papers (2003-2015), Defence Postures 2007, Strategic Defence Review 2008 & 2011, and Minimum Essential Force policy (Zebec 2016).

These policies are the evidence that the Indonesian government has developed a new structure and

function of the MoD that represents the democratic principle of civilian control of the armed forces. The civilian control of the armed forces should be implemented by establishing procedural guidance in support for the formulation and approval of the National Military Strategy. In 2008, the Ministry of Defence issued a Defence Doctrine document defining the concept of “total defence” as the total participation of national entities and resources in state defence (DEPHAN RI 2007).

The priorities of top officials of the defence ministry seems to have changed over the course of post-authoritarian years. The early years of reform, represented by Minister Juwono Sudarsono and Minister Matori Abdul Jalil, has seen the civilian leadership in the MoD focus on the formulation of basic legal instruments that deprives the military of its non-defence functions and allows it to perform military functions in domestic realm within the limits set by the regulations; the second term of Minister Juwono Sudarsono in the office of Minister of Defence saw a doctrinal change as well as defence posture planning that set the military to transform into an outward looking deterrent force; Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro's term is marked by a commitment to resuscitating indigenous defence industrial capacity. Finally, the term of Minister Ryamizard Riyacudu in office is marked by an emphasis of military's function in developing and maintaining the nation's sense of patriotism. While different ministers have different priorities, the ongoing priority throughout the ministries is developing a Minimum Essential Force that was set to take place between 2009 and 2024 (Weatherbee 2016).

#### ***Institutional Relations of TNI and MoD***

However, the MoD is plagued by an inability to include the TNI within its jurisdiction of control. Law 3/2002 on National Defence stipulated that both the MoD and the TNI answer to the President, which means both institutions are on equal standing instead of the TNI being part of the MoD.

On the other hand, Law 34/2004 on TNI stipulated that the TNI is “under the coordination of the MoD” which means that the TNI refers to the MoD for strategic planning matters including national defence management, budgeting policy, procurement, recruitment, national resources management, and defence industry technology required by the TNI and other defence components. TNI Commander maintains an authority over education, training, force preparation, and doctrine.

### **The MoD sets the regulations on the roles and authorities of the Ministry of Defence in defence policy-making, and its institutional relationship with TNI Headquarters as well as other government institutions**

The formulation of the law suggests an assumption of a clean delineation between TNI's and MoD's tasks: while the first carries out force preparation and rules of engagement, the latter carries out conceptualisation of strategy and defence procurement.

In other words, the perception held by the TNI is that the MoD conceptualises the defence policies while the TNI carries them out. Such a separation of duties means that the TNI is not under the leadership of MoD. Although the position of the Minister of Defence since 1999 has been occupied by civilians, none of them explicitly strived to position the TNI under MoD's leadership.

Furthermore, 20% of officials who work in the MoD are active duty officers and the MoD has no control in selecting which officers from the TNI headquarter are sent to be seconded under the MoD (Mietzner 2011).

Civilian leadership of defence matters is ideally measured in terms of the capacity to make a final decision, to control the defence policy agenda, to define the limits of the military's institutional autonomy, and to perform an oversight of the military's defence activities and give sanctions to transgressions of laws (Croissant and Kuehn, 2009: 190). These categories of civilian leadership on defence matters sit on an assumption that civilian leaders have already had a good grasp of the strategic matters in which the military can be put into good use in accordance to their trained-capacity. When performed under such assumptions, civilian leadership will produce a professional military that is not self-tasking in nature, where it sets for itself the duties or missions that it ought to undertake and measurement of success for them.

Up until 2004, Indonesianists from outside the country have made astute observations on indicators of TNI's involvement in transgressions of civilian leaders' decisions in flash-points of conflict in Indonesia, including the possible military's sabotage of the civilian government's agenda in East Timor in 1999

(Schulze 2001), conduct of independent (unsanctioned) operations in Papua in 2000, and derailing of the Aceh ceasefire negotiations in 2003 (Aspinall and Klinken 2011).

### *Defence Economics*

The road to a professional military and a well-performing civilian leadership over defence matters lies on the capability of the state to mount sufficient funding for the professional and strategically deployed military (Eekelen 2005).

Between the year 2000 and 2014, Indonesia had continually increased the size of defence budget but at the same time it has continually suffered from “defence-economic discrepancy” due to the difference made by the actual defence budget required for defence development and *budget proposals* prepared by the MoD for the parliament approval of which only about one-third would be approved by the parliament (Sebastian and Gindarsah 2013).

A case in point was the 2010 defence budget where the parliament approved 30% of the total budget proposed by the government. The defence-economic gap raises further questions on whether the defence spending is rationalised in accordance to the approved defence budget, or an off-budget funding, including businesses and illegal activities, which becomes a source of funding to fill the gap. Indonesia's defence budget, despite years of gradual rise, is still far below China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and even Singapore.

### **The Parliament**

The Indonesian parliament carries out three functions in the realm defence policy-making: legislation, oversight, and budget. The hallmark of legislation was the first to emerge in the beginning of *reformasi* where the parliament Law 3/2002 on National Defence and Law 34/2004 on the TNI. The Law on National Defence has clearly separated defence from the wider realm of security. Meanwhile Law 34/2004 has provided a legal basis for the TNI to carry out its tasks and authorities in

national defence.

More recent developments in defence legislation comprised of Law 16/2012 on National Defence Industry and Law 25/2014 on Military Discipline. National Defence Industry Law focused on facilitating a relationship between the military and defence industry elites, and allowing for the more usage of domestic products of defence equipment and transfer of technology from foreign defence industries.

Military Discipline Law was initiated by former officers sitting the parliament and regulates the forms of violations of military discipline as well as the formation of Military Discipline Oversight Council as a body that sits within the TNI itself.

Legislation has been absent for other more crucial laws, including Law on National Security, Law on Reserve Command and Law on Military Operations Other Than War. The absence of these laws may indicate the lack of capacity of parliamentarians to envision the total control of the state over its coercive arms to anticipate all kinds of contingencies. National Security Law, for example, has been debated since 2005

and sticking point seems to be on the establishment of a National Security Council that should be responsible in facilitating the executive power on deciding the deployment of forces during contingencies. This would put the Council on the top of coordination of the TNI, the police and intelligence (Badan Intelijen Negara/BIN).

To conduct its role of oversight, Indonesian parliament is authorised to summon executive body's representatives as well as those from civil society groups to a public or closed hearing. Commission I of the parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/ DPR) can form a Working Committee (Panitia Kerja/Panja) where members of parliament whose focus of work has been on defence and security could sit together; these members are sent to represent the views of their political parties which ideally form the whole interest of the nation. Through the working committees,

**In other words, the perception held by the TNI is that the MoD conceptualises the defence policies while the TNI carries them out. Such a separation of duties means that the TNI is not under the leadership of MoD. Although the position of the Minister of Defence since 1999 has been occupied by civilians, none of them explicitly strived to position the TNI under MoD's leadership**

member of the DPR can summon the government representatives and conduct investigative measures on various matters pertaining to defence procurements, deployments of TNI forces, the welfare of the soldiers and veterans, among other matters.

One of the important working committees established was the Working Committee on Defence Procurement (Panja Alutsista) whose task was to evaluate the accomplishment of Minimum Essential Force (MEF) target set by the Ministry of Defence back in 2007. MEF is government's programme in accomplishing a minimum military capability required to secure Indonesia's territorial reaches. It is planned to unfold in three stages (2009-2014, 2014-2019, and 2019-2024) each of which requires approximately 12 billion USD. The DPR is infamous for blocking the funding of defence from being disbursed by the Ministry of Finance for clarification purposes, which causes delays in defence procurement. Nevertheless, the DPR has as much commitment as the executive in building up Indonesia's military and particularly to surpass Malaysia and Singapore through the expansion of defence budget from slightly over 3 billion USD in 2010 to 15 billion USD in 2015. It is expected that in the period of 2020 – 2024, Indonesia's defence budget will be around 3.1% of the GDP.

The DPR has plenty of unfinished homework. A chief homework that is yet to begin is the formulation of Reserve Command Law, which is supposed to be an institutionalisation of State Defence program (Bela Negara). The latter programme is designed to allow civilians to participate in defence endeavour. Public concern regarding this program is that it would take up resources needed to build up the main component of defence, which is the TNI itself. The DPR has also yet

---

**Civilian leadership of defence matters is ideally measured in terms of the capacity to make a final decision, to control the defence policy agenda, to define the limits of the military's institutional autonomy, and to perform an oversight of the military's defence activities and give sanctions to transgressions of laws**

---

to formulate an addendum to the existing TNI Law (Law 34/2004) regarding military operations other than war. The increasing multiplication of non-traditional threats that require the use of force to respond means that the legal basis to deploy the military to support police missions in fighting internal security contingencies needs to be devised immediately.

Thirdly, the DPR has yet to decide on the law of civilian courts for officers violating human rights. Clause 62(2) of the TNI Law has mandated that TNI officers' offences of military penal code will be subject of military court while offences of public penal code will be subject of public (civilian) court. Therefore, another more specific law or an addendum is required to see the implementation of this clause.

The most significant deficiency that 17 years of Indonesian military reform has not repaired is the mindset of parliamentarians in for defence policy and strategic planning. Civilian control on defence matters is still a missing ethos among the majority of parliamentarians; instead what seems to be glaring is their apathy and unwillingness to develop an expertise on defence issues and hesitation to carry out their constitutional duties of ensuring the military is professionally-equipped and trained.

Parliamentarians seldom evaluate the synergy between defence policy, strategic planning and defence programming when they are carrying out fit and proper test for TNI's commander-in-chief position. Instead, they tend to focus on personal matters and miss out on visions of reorganising TNI's force structure. Indonesian parliament's lack of comprehension of the complexities of technical-operational requirements and management of financial issues in national defence is indicated by the outstanding unfinished legislation of defence bills.

Indonesia's current political system is also less than helpful in facilitating an objective civilian oversight. Parliamentarians are grouped under their respective "party caucuses" or *fraksi* through which political parties shape the views of parliamentarians of certain issues or government policies. Members of parliament who express views that are different from their party's directives may be reprimanded or even recalled from their parliamentary positions. Party's directives have often held back parliamentarians to carry out their constitutional oversight responsibilities over defence issues.

For example, the management of defence spending has

---

**Between the year 2000 and 2014, Indonesia had continually increased the size of defence budget but at the same time it has continually suffered from “defence-economic discrepancy” due to the difference made by the actual defence budget required for defence development and budget proposals prepared by the MoD for the parliament approval of which only about one-third would be approved by the parliament**

---

suffered from deviations as reported by the State Audit Agency (BPK) and yet no recommendations are made to law enforcement agencies. It seems that the lack of sophisticated know-how in defence policy making has been helped considerably by the presence of an epistemic community of defence policy matters that would readily carry out their duties to advise the parliamentary as well as executive bodies.

### **Civil Society**

As part of national commitment to rebuild a professional-armed force, the process of military reform saw the evolution of an epistemic “defence policy community,” whereby civilian intellectuals could engage in discussions with defence policy-makers and parliament members on various defence and security issues.

Since late 2000, many Indonesian scholars associated with the Pro-Patria Institute, a small think tank concerned with security sector reform, played a substantial role through “focus group discussions” to support officials in Ministry of Defence responsible for preparing draft bills on national defence.

Later, Pacivis, a research centre at the University of Indonesia in tandem with other centres also participated in policy-research activities.

In 2009, the Indonesian government established the Indonesian Defence University, where civilians and the

military will interact and debate the key issues of defence policy-making. Through frequent engagement with the academic community, government officials and military officers were able to absorb new policy relevant ideas and strengthen their intellectual capabilities.

The epistemic community of defence and security academics who are mostly educated in Western postgraduate institutions are the indispensable part of Indonesia's military reform. The pressure of the West to democratise the security sector, the gate of reform that has been opened by the military itself, and the availability of a few young scholars who already studied disciplines such as strategic studies and International Relations make it possible for civilian intellectuals to engage in discussions with defence policy-makers, parliament members as well as TNI officers on various defence and security issues.

Non-state think tanks emerged and organised meetings that made such discussions possible; these included the Pro-Patria Institute, which pioneered a series of focused group discussions to support the Ministry of Defence in preparing draft bills on national defence and security laws. Later on, Pacivis produced policy research on national intelligence organisation. It produced a book on the guideline for the formulation of Intelligence Law in a democratic state and a book on the historical view of Indonesia's national intelligence.

The Intelligence Law that was produced in 2011, however, does not reflect a great success for Pacivis' advocacy for intelligence in democratic state as it appointed State Intelligence Body (BIN/ Badan Intelijen Negara) as both coordinator and executor of intelligence activities. This is in contrary to Pacivis' advice in order to strengthen oversight on intelligence conduct but also for protection of agents from mistreatments.

In addition to these two organisations, a partnership between political leaders, military leaders and civilian experts on defence and security has also been nurtured by various civil-society organisations such as CSIS-Jakarta, ELSAM (Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy), Imparsial (Indonesian Human Rights Monitor), the Human Rights Working Group, the Indonesian Corruption Watch, LIPI (Indonesian Science Institute), KontraS (Commission o, the RIDEP Institute, University of Gajah Mada, and Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (YLBHI). Some of these organisations are research institutes such as LIPI and CSIS; others are human rights activist

organisations such as KontraS and YLBHI. Together with the aforementioned Pacivis and Propatria, these CSOs formed a coalition called “Indonesia’s Working Group for Security Reform”. The working group actively engaged political and military elites in drafting defence and security bills, including State’s Secret Bill, Intelligence Bill and Freedom of Information Bill. The academic concepts in civil-military relations, professional conduct of the military and strategic thoughts are negotiated with the relevant stakeholders, and such practice broke the traditional monopoly of the military in security-related legislation.

### **Macro-Structural factors**

This section will briefly consider the scope of strategic environment considered by Indonesian defence establishment. As a result of military reform, the TNI has been encouraged to undertake a wider ambit of strategic environment than the regime’s survival against domestic political rivals, as was the case during the Suharto era.

The pro-reform military officials voiced their criticism towards military’s subordination to the regime and they were the ones marginalised by Suharto, until pro-democracy movement emerged in 1998. However, even after the demise of Suharto, the military’s threat priority is still dominated by the primacy of internal threats. Such threat priority is partly nurtured by their involvement in politics in the past; at the same time, the volatility of peace and stability was very much contributed by domestic actors, some of which were influenced by foreign ones. While the need of military’s deployment to domestic contingencies is institutionalised in the TNI and State Defence Laws, there is a need to push the military’s threat priority outward in order to direct the military capability development towards establishing standing forces that can serve as a deterrent power and a quick

response to international contingencies where CBM and deterrence fail to avoid conflict. The development of the armed forces has so far mainly responded to internal threats to territorial and ideological integrity.

The inward-looking character of Indonesia’s threat priorities is contributed in major part by the domination of the Army in defence decision-making. Despite Indonesia’s inescapable geographical feature as a maritime-archipelagic state, the doctrinal foundation set by the defence planners in the past left a legacy of army-domination instead of a capable and modernised navy. Both Indonesian Air Forces and Navy were regarded as providing direct support to the Army and

the threat priorities tend to focus on the ongoing internal security threats which could have been responded through civilian peace-building and law-enforcement measures. Another legacy of problem includes small defence budgets, ageing equipment and low general standing for the Navy.

This inward looking threat perception has recently moved outwards towards the defence of Indonesia’s immediate surrounding. Forces that are perceived to present a potential challenge to the sovereign rights of the nation begin to have serious consideration by the defence ministry, other ministerial departments and public at large.

Since the 2008 Defence White Paper, Indonesian Ministry of Defence has emphasised that the capacity to mount a credible deterrence is the aim of defence development. The

overall defence doctrine, Total Defence System, has experienced no dramatic change in Indonesia’s military reform; it still relies on the principles of territoriality, totality and people’s involvement. What has changed is the reformulation of the strategic importance of this defence doctrine for the purpose of nation-state building and defence.

**Military Discipline Law was initiated by former officers sitting the parliament and regulates the forms of violations of military discipline as well as the formation of Military Discipline Oversight Council as a body that sits within the TNI itself Legislation has been absent for other more crucial laws, including Law on National Security, Law on Reserve Command and Law on Military Operations Other Than War. The absence of these laws may indicate the lack of capacity of parliamentarians to envision the total control of the state over its coercive arms to anticipate all kinds of contingencies**

The South China Sea dispute is a case in point. Since the 2003 Defence White Paper, the South China Sea has been mentioned as a potential flash-point the Indonesian defence must anticipate, and the concern is more on the possibility of Confidence Building Measure failure among stakeholders in the area (DEPHAN RI 2003). Indonesia's Defence White Paper in 2014 has put a massive and active military presence of China and the rebalancing of the US Rebalancing Strategy to respond to it as one of the priority concerns (Kementerian Negara Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (Bappenas) 2014).

This is viewed by the 2014 White Paper as a source of speculation and uncertainty for states in the Asia Pacific, leading to a military build-up in the area (Ryacudu 2015). We can compare this with 2003 Defence White Paper that emphasizes on territorial disputes that Indonesia has with other states as one of its priorities. Although these disputes have not shown any progress towards resolution, they are no longer a source of concern and are perceived not to be a potential for conflicts. This latter thinking suggests a progressive development in Indonesia's defence diplomacy with other states both inside and outside Southeast Asia.

Throughout the military-reform era, non-traditional security has continually appeared in the defence white

papers of Indonesia. Due to the linkage between external and internal factors that lead to emergence of non-traditional security, the absence of credible deterrence can be blamed to have caused the ever-present threat or risk of non-traditional security.

The problems surrounding Indonesia's maritime security is an example of how the absence of credible deterrence leads to an increasing presence of non-traditional security. The weak maritime surveillance inherited by Suharto regime has led to an increasing number on incidence of piracy and sea-robbery up until 2005 before regional responses of counter-piracy efforts, government control and regional joint patrols and surveillance tightened (Bradford 2008). The same can be said with regards to terrorism where the absence of a national security system to respond to threats of terrorist attacks and radicalism led to an explosion of terrorist attacks in the early years of reform until 2003 when Detachment 88 of the police was formed as an anti-terrorist special force (Schneier 2009).

**The most significant deficiency that 17 years of Indonesian military reform has not repaired is the mindset of parliamentarians in for defence policy and strategic planning. Civilian control on defence matters is still a missing ethos among the majority of parliamentarians; instead what seems to be glaring is their apathy and unwillingness to develop an expertise on defence issues and hesitation to carry out their constitutional duties of ensuring the military is professionally-equipped and trained**

## **Conclusion**

The post-military reform Indonesian civilian defence leaders have been able to formulate defence policies in a well-documented and accountable manner, and the military has by and large implemented them in the post-2004 era. The unfinished agenda of military reform is a testament to the limit of commitment of civilian leaders in shaping the military as a credible force of deterrence and leverage of the state's diplomacy vis-à-vis other actors in the international realm. It also shows the extent to which the military's strategic culture as an institution of political/ideological soldiers remain intact.

The work towards removing the undemocratic character of the TNI has not finished yet. The Indonesian military generals are still capable of pronouncing ideological threats to the country in times of political tension and they have not entirely abandoned the agenda of interfering in domestic politics through logistical mobilisation of the masses.

However, the work that is being done here is to build a foundation of cultural transformation through packages of political regulation to direct the path of military transformation. Towards this end, Indonesian civil society, consisting of defence and security academics and human rights activists, has been central in pushing forward the agenda of military transformation into a professional force and the Ministry of Defence as a policy-making body.

After nineteen years of reform, Indonesia has produced no record of military's formal influence in the military. Civilian oligarchs instead of military's influence have dominated domestic political contestation in Indonesia. However, the most important unfinished agenda of military reform is the defence transformation towards a military with a credible deterrence towards regional and extra-regional states. The enduring and ever increasing non-traditional threats to Indonesia is largely contributed by the nation's incapability to mount a credible deterrence.

A credible deterrence can significantly boost the country's leverage in conducting defence diplomacy and international security cooperation in responding to threats and contingencies. Furthermore, enabling the military to become a credible deterrence also means more budgetary commitment for the military and less incentive for the latter to be involved in domestic business adventurism.

The main impediment to achieving a military with a credible deterrence is at the moment the capacity of civilian leaders to settle the democratic consolidation and move on with other more strategic interests of the nation. This means that the agenda of military transformation is still being competed with matters pertaining to economic inequality and access to political participation.

## Bibliography

- Aspinall, Edward, and Gerry Van Klinken. 2011. *The State and Illegality in Indonesia*. Leiden: KITLV Press.
- Bradford, John F. 2008. "Shifting the Tides against Piracy in Southeast Asian Waters." *Asian Survey* 48 (3): 473–91. doi:10.1525/as.2008.48.3.473.
- Eekelen, Willem F Van. 2005. "The Parliamentary Dimension of Defence Procurement. Requirements, Production, Cooperation and Acquisition." Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces Occasional (March).
- Freedman, Amy L. 2000. *Political Participation and Ethnic Minorities: Chinese Overseas in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the United States*. New York, London: Routledge.
- Fukuoka, Yuki. 2012. "Politics, Business and the State in Post-Soeharto Indonesia." *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs* 34 (1): 80–100. doi:10.1355/cs34-1d.
- Hainsworth, Geoffrey. 2007. "Rule of Law, Anti-Corruption, Anti-Terrorism and Militant Islam: Coping with Threats to Democratic Pluralism and National Unity in Indonesia." *Asia Pacific Viewpoint* 48 (1): 128–44. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8373.2007.00335.x.
- Honna, Jun. 2006. "Local Civil-Military Relations during the First Phase of Democratic Transition, 1999-2004: A Comparison of West, Central and East Java." *Indonesia* 82 (October 2006): 75–96. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40376394>.
- . 2008. "Instrumentalizing Pressures, Reinventing Mission: Indonesian Navy Battles for Turf in the Age of Reformasi." *Indonesia* 86 (86): 63–80. <http://cip.cornell.edu/DPubS?service=UI&version=1.0&verb=Display&page=record&handle=seap.indo/1227644178>.
- IDSPS. 2008. "Kebijakan Umum Pertahanan Negara," no. September.
- Kementerian Negara Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (Bappenas). 2014. "Buku I Agenda Pembangunan Nasional," 1–289. [perpustakaan.bappenas.go.id/lontar/file?file=digital/20905-\[\\_Konten\\_\]...](http://perpustakaan.bappenas.go.id/lontar/file?file=digital/20905-[_Konten_]...)
- Mietzner, Marcus. 2011. "Overcoming Path Dependence: The Quality of Civilian Control of the Military in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia." *Asian Journal of Political Science* 19 (3): 270–89. doi:10.1080/02185377.2011.628148.
- . 2014. "Successful and Failed Democratic Transitions from Military Rule in Majority Muslim Societies: The Cases of Indonesia and Egypt." *Contemporary Politics* 20 (4). Taylor & Francis: 435–52. doi:10.1080/13569775.2014.968473.
- Rabasa, Angel, and John Haseman. 2002. *The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power*. Santa Monica: RAND.
- Ramage, Douglas E. n.d. *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance*. London and New York: Routledge.
- RI, Departemen Pertahanan. 2007. *Doktrin Pertahanan Negara*.
- Ryacudu, Ryamizard. 2015. *Buku Putih Pertahanan Indonesia*. Jakarta: Kementerian Pertahanan Republik Indonesia.
- Schneier, Edward V. 2009. "Reformasi and the Indonesian 'War on Terror': State, Military and Legislative–Executive

- Relations in an Emerging Democracy.” *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 15 (March 2015): 294–313. doi:10.1080/13572330902933508.
- Schulze, Kirsten E. 2001. “The East Timor Referendum Crisis and Its Impact on Indonesian Politics.” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 24 (1): 77–82.
- Sebastian, Leonard C., and Iis Gindarsah. 2011. “Assessing 12-Year Military Reform in Indonesia: Major Strategic Gaps for the Next Stage of Reform.” 227. Singapore.
- . 2013. “Assessing Military Reform in Indonesia.” *Defense & Security Analysis* 29 (4): 293–307. doi:10.1080/14751798.2013.842709.
- Sukadis, Beni, ed. 2007. *Almanak Reformasi Sektor Keamanan Indonesia*.
- The ASEAN Secretariat. 2015. “ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead Together,” 1689–99. doi:10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004.
- Weatherbee, Donald E. 2016. “Understanding Jokowi's Foreign Policy.” *Trends in Southeast Asia*. Singapore.
- Wibisono, Ali Abdullah, Broto Wardoyo, and Yandry Kurniawan Kasim. 2008. *Satu Dekade Reformasi Militer*.
- , Ali Abdullah & Makmur Keliat, *Civil-Military Relations Reform: The Case Study of Indonesia*, presented at PILDAT International Conference on Civil-Military Relations, Lahore, Pakistan, October 2008
- Widjajanto, Andi. 2007. “Transforming Indonesia's Armed Forces.” *UNISCI Discussion Papers* 15 (October): 19–36.
- Zebe, Tvrtko. 2016. *Power Politics in Asia's Contested Waters*. *Ethnologie Française*. Vol. 43. doi:10.3917/ethn.132.0267.



**Islamabad Office:** P. O. Box 278, F-8, Postal Code: 44220, Islamabad, Pakistan  
**Lahore Office:** P. O. Box 11098, L.C.C.H.S, Postal Code: 54792, Lahore, Pakistan  
E-mail: [info@pildat.org](mailto:info@pildat.org) | Website: [www.pildat.org](http://www.pildat.org)